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Eighty-nine States are today bound by international treaties that prohibit 
the death penalty. Most other States are bound by international treaties that 
limit or restrict the use of capital punishment. Only a handful of States are 
subject to no human rights treaty obligations concerning the use of capital 
punishment. It appears that most if not all States in this latter category 
consider that they are required to observe the main restrictions or limitations 
imposed by the treaties, even in the absence of treaty obligations as such. 
Aside from the human rights treaties, various other international law 
conventions may govern the use of capital punishment. This is the case with 
the third and fourth Geneva Conventions, whereby the sentencing and 
execution of prisoners of war and of civilians in an occupied territory are 
restricted. In the field of international criminal law, the death penalty was 
permitted by the earliest instruments, in particular the London Agreement 
establishing the International Military Tribunal. It is now excluded by the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Finally, many bilateral 
treaties in the area of extradition and mutual legal assistance contemplate the 
issue of capital punishment. 
The core international human rights treaties of general application treat 
capital punishment as an exception to the protection of the right to life. The 
European Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1950, affirms that ‘[n]o 
one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law’. No limitations upon capital punishment are set out in the 
text. Subsequent instruments, in particular the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, 
adopt the same general principle although they employ a somewhat different 
formulation, associating capital punishment with several safeguards, 
restrictions and limitations. Each of these general human rights treaties has 
been subject to revision by means of additional protocols that prohibit the 
death penalty. 
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I. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES THAT PROHIBIT THE DEATH PENALTY 
In the early 1970s, the Council of Europe began work on an additional 
protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights aimed at the 
abolition of capital punishment. Consensus on full abolition could not be 
achieved. The compromise reached in 1983, in Protocol No. 6 to the 
Convention, was a text proclaiming that  
“[t]he death penalty shall be abolished, and that ‘[n]o one shall be condemned to 
such penalty or executed’. States Parties were however permitted to apply the 
death penalty ‘in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of 
war”.  
Two decades later, Protocol No. 13 removed the wartime exception. 
Protocol No. 6 has been ratified by all Member States of the Council of 
Europe other than Russia. Protocol No. 13 has been ratified by all Member 
States with the exception of Armenia, which has signed, and Azerbaijan and 
Russia, which have not signed. Despite their failure to fully accept the treaty 
obligations, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia are all are considered to be 
States that are abolitionist de jure. In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
this is a consequence of legislation, whereas Russia is prevented from 
imposing the death penalty by a judgment of its Constitutional Court.1 
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights was adopted in 1989. Eighty-one States are parties to the 
Protocol and three others, Angola, Madagascar and Sao Tome and Principe, 
have signed the Second Optional Protocol but have yet to ratify it. In its 
report to the Human Rights Council, Angola noted the signature of the 
Second Optional Protocol saying it was “in the process of ratification”.2 
Several States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights have fully abolished the death penalty in law but have not signed or 
ratified the Second Optional Protocol. These States are Burundi, Cambodia, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Senegal, Togo and Vanuatu. 
The Second Optional Protocol specifies that  
“[n]o one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be 
executed’ and that ‘[e]ach State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish 
the death penalty within its jurisdiction”.  
Consequently, a State that has not fully abolished the death penalty may 
ratify or accede to the Second Optional Protocol provided that there is a 
moratorium in place and that it takes ‘all necessary measures’ in order to 
abolish capital punishment. Three States Parties to the Second Optional 
Protocol, Liberia, Benin and Mongolia, are not yet abolitionist in their 
                                                                          
1 See: National report, Russia, A/HRC/WG.6/16/RUS/1, §31. 
2 National report, A/HRC/WG.6/20/AGO/1, Angola, §27. 
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domestic law. Given their treaty obligations, it may be appropriate to speak 
of such States as being de jure and not merely de facto abolitionist in that 
they are henceforth bound by international law not to impose capital 
punishment. 
Other States considered abolitionist de facto but not de jure have confirmed 
their intention to ratify or accede to the Second Optional Protocol. For 
example, Sierra Leone told the United Nations Human Rights Council that it 
accepted “in principle” recommendations that it ratify or accede to the 
Second Optional Protocol, “subject to constitutional review”.3 Somalia also 
accepted such recommendations, saying, 
“[t]he Government will look into the matter regarding the second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty”.4  
Suriname5 and Tajikistan6 also accepted similar recommendations. Given 
that there are approximately 50 States deemed abolitionist de facto, because 
they have not conducted an execution in at least a decade, it would seem 
possible to promote an increase in the number of States Parties to the Second 
Optional Protocol by convincing more such States to ratify.  
Seven States that have abolished the death penalty, Bhutan, the Cook 
Islands, the Holy See, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Niue 
are not parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
as a result they cannot ratify or accede to the Second Optional Protocol. 
Some of these states have indicated that they cannot presently consider 
accession or ratification to the International Covenant because of resource 
constraints.7 Kiribati did not accept a recommendation from the Human 
Rights Council that it ratify the International Covenant, citing “existing 
national capacity and resource constraints”.8 Probably there would be more 
States Parties to the Second Optional Protocol were ratification possible by 
States that are not party to the Covenant itself. There is a good precedent for 
this in United Nations treaty practice: a State that is not party to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child may nevertheless ratify the Optional 
Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. 
There are 13 States Parties to the Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty. In 2012, Venezuela denounced 
                                                                          
3 Report of the Working Group Sierra Leone, Addendum, A/HRC/18/10/Add.1. 
4 The consideration by the Government of Somalia of the 155 recommendations, 21 September 2011, 
§96.68. 
5 Report of the Working Group Suriname, Addendum, A/HRC/18/12/Add.1, §§73.32-73.38. 
6 Report of the Working Group Tajikistan, Addendum, A/HRC/19/3/Add.1, §90.10. 
7 Report of the Working Group, Bhutan, A/HRC/27/8/Add.1, para. 2.1; Kiribati responses to 
conclusions and/or recommendations, A/HRC/15/3/Add.1, para. 11; Report of the Working Group, 
Marshall Islands, A/HRC/16/12/Add.1, Addendum, §55.1. 
8 Kiribati responses to conclusions and/or recommendations, A/HRC/15/3/Add.1, §11. 
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the American Convention on Human Rights. Although the Protocol may only 
be ratified or acceded to by a State Party to the American Convention, unlike 
the Convention itself the Protocol has no denunciation clause nor did 
Venezuela’s denunciation purport to cover the Protocol. The American 
Convention on Human Rights specifies that a State that has abolished the 
death penalty may not reintroduce it. Thus, States that ratify or accede to the 
American Convention that are abolitionist at the time have, in effect, bound 
themselves to an international obligation comparable to those of the 
protocols. Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and Peru are 
parties to the American Convention and have abolished the death penalty but 
they have not ratified or acceded to any of the abolitionist protocols. 
The success of the abolitionist protocols provides an important 
manifestation of the general trend towards the elimination of capital 
punishment. For most States, ratification or accession is quite symbolic 
because of a commitment to abolitionist that is secured by legislation, 
consistent case law, constitutional provisions and a large consensus of public 
opinion. In some States, however, the legal consequence of adherence to one 
or other of the abolitionist treaties may be significant. 
Ironically, the abolitionist protocols within the European human rights 
system have been cited by the European Court in order to retard the 
progressive interpretation of the European Convention itself. In Soering v. 
the United Kingdom, the plenary European Court of Human Rights explained 
that, 
“Protocol No. 6, as a subsequent written agreement, shows that the intention of 
the Contracting Parties as recently as 1983 was to adopt the normal method of 
amendment of the text in order to introduce a new obligation to abolish capital 
punishment in time of peace and, what is more, to do so by an optional instrument 
allowing each State to choose the moment when to undertake such an 
engagement”.  
The Court added that, 
“[i]n these conditions, notwithstanding the special character of the Convention, 
Article 3 [of the Convention] cannot be interpreted as generally prohibiting the 
death penalty”. 9  
The Grand Chamber adopted a similar approach with respect to Protocol 
No. 13 in Öcalan v. Turkey, noting that the States Parties had elected to 
follow “the traditional method of amendment of the text of the Convention” 
rather than leaving the issue to judicial innovation.10 
                                                                          
9 ECHR, decision of 7 July 1989, Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, §91. 
10 ECHR, decision of 12 May 2005, Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, §164-165. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has now moved to a position 
whereby it deems the reference to capital punishment in article 2 of the 
Convention to be no longer valid. In Al Nashiri v. Poland, the Court said the 
fact that  
“imposition and use of the death penalty negates fundamental human rights has 
been recognised by the member States of the Council of Europe”.  
It described judicial executions as “the deliberate and premeditated 
destruction of a human being by the State authorities”, adding that the 
extinction of human life involves physical pain regardless of the method of 
execution. Furthermore,  
“the foreknowledge of death at the hands of the State must inevitably give rise to 
intense psychological suffering”.11  
In effect, then, with such a progressive interpretation of the Convention 
itself, Protocols No. 6 and 13 have little or no raison d’être. Moreover, it 
would be accurate to describe the European Convention, according to the 
interpretation now prevailing at the European Court of Human Rights, as an 
abolitionist treaty. It would certainly be impossible now for a new State to 
ratify the Convention without having abolished the death penalty. 
Before concluding with the fully abolitionist treaties, mention should be 
made of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Reprising almost 
exactly a phrase from article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, article 2(2) of the Charter declares that  
“[n]o one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed”.  
II. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES THAT RESTRICT THE DEATH PENALTY 
Not quite 40 States still continue to use the death penalty. In any given 
year, approximately 20 States actually conduct executions. These numbers 
continue to decline. It seems to be only a matter of time, perhaps a decade or 
two, before the death penalty disappears. Most of the States that practice 
capital punishment are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. They are bound by treaty to several limitations on capital 
punishment set out in article 6 of the Covenant. In particular, they may only 
impose the death penalty  
“for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide”.  
                                                                          
11 ECHR, decision of 24 July 2014, Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application No. 28761/11, §577.  
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Capital punishment ‘can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment 
rendered by a competent court’. A person sentenced to death has the right ‘to 
seek pardon or commutation of the sentence’. Furthermore,  
“[a]mnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all 
cases”.  
The death penalty may not be imposed upon persons below the age of 18 at 
the time of the offence and on pregnant women. 
The minimum standards on the death penalty set out in article 6 of the 
Covenant have been interpreted and to some degree amplified in resolutions 
of the Economic and Social Council, notably the Safeguards guaranteeing 
protection of those facing the death penalty and in the case law of the Human 
Rights Committee. In recent years, the Committee has issued Views on the 
prohibition of a mandatory death penalty,12 the requirement that procedural 
fairness be scrupulously observed,13 risk of capital punishment in the event 
of extradition, expulsion or deportation14 and conditions on death row.15 On 
two occasions, it also issued press releases expressing grave concern at the 
imposition of death sentences in Belarus despite the issuance of a request that 
execution be stayed pending consideration of the case by the Human Rights 
Committee. The Committee described such actions as “flagrant violations of 
the human rights treaty obligations of Belarus”.16 The Human Rights 
Committee has also addressed issues relating to the death penalty in its 
consideration of periodic reports. 
Of the States that continue to practise capital punishment, nine have not 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: China, 
Malaysia, Oman, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Sudan, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. Both China and Taiwan (as 
the Republic of China) have signed the Covenant. Many of the States in this 
category have indicated in their reports to the Human Rights Council that 
they comply with most if not all of the standards set out in article 6 of the 
                                                                          
12 CCPR, decision of 14 May 2005, Weerawansa v. Sri Lanka, Application No. 1406/2005; CCPR, 
2006 Mwamba v. Zambia, Application No. 1520/2006. CCPR, decision of 23 March 2012, Kamoyo 
v. Zambia ; CCPR, decision of 27 March 2014, Johnson v. Ghana, Application No. 2177/2012. 
13 CCPR, decision of 10 March 2010, Mwamba v. Zambia, Application No. 1520/2006; CCPR, 
decision of 25 March 2011, Otabek Akhadov v. Kyrgyzstan, Application No. 1503/2006; CCPR, 
decision of 29 March 2011, Andrei Khoroshenko v. Russia, Application No. 1304/2004; CCPR, 
decision of 29 October 2012, Lyubov Kovaleva and Tatyana Kozyar v. Belarus, Application No. 
2120/2011; CCPR, decision of 23 march 2012, Svetlana Zhuk v. William Kamoyo v. Zambia, 
Application No. 1859/2009; CCPR, decision of 30 October 2013, Belarus, Application No. 
1910/2009.  
14 CCPR, decision of 1 November 2011, X. v. Sweden, Application No. 1833/2008. 
15 CCPR, decision of 23 March 2012, William Kamoyo v. Zambia, Application No. 1859/2009; 
CCPR, decision of 10 March 2010, Mwamba v. Zambia, Application No.1520/2006. 
16 Report of the Human Rights Committee, A/66/40 (Vol. I), §§50-51; Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, A/67/40 (Vol. I), §§55-57. 
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Covenant.17 Malaysia even told the Council that it applies safeguards that 
“are in line with international standards, in particular Article 6 of 
ICCPR”.18 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have ratified the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights. The Arab Charter contains a provision on capital 
punishment that is adapted from article 6 of the Covenant although it does 
not adequately prohibit exhibition for offences committed by persons under 
the age of 18. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the abolitionist protocols are becoming increasingly redundant in 
light of the progressive interpretation of the right to life provisions of the 
main human rights treaties, they may nevertheless be of considerable legal 
importance in States that have not fully abolished capital punishment in their 
domestic law. More attention might usefully be devoted to persuading States 
that are still only abolitionist de facto to ratify or accede to the instruments. 
The number of States that applies capital punishment continues to decline. 
Although not all of these States have accepted the international treaties 
containing limitations or restrictions on the death penalty, they seem willing 
to acknowledge that these are international standards that must be followed 
even in the absence of a convention obligation. In other words, the norms set 
out in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
must also constitute customary international law. 
                                                                          
17 China, National Report, A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1, §§43-44; Malaysia, National Report, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/MYS/1, §45; Oman, National Report, A/HRC/WG.6/10/OMN/1, §§76-78; Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Working Group Report, A/HRC/17/12, §§9-13; Saudi Arabia, National Report, 
A/HRC/WG.6/17/SAU/1, §35; Saudi Arabia, Working Group Report, A/HRC/25/3, §97; Singapore, 
National Report, A/HRC/WG.6/11/SGP/1, §§113-120. 
18 Malaysia, National Report, A/HRC/WG.6/17/MYS/1, §45. 
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